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Searching for a

UMass

Transitions and
Leaderships,

President

1970-1991

Richard A. Hogarty

This article traces the history of the five presidential successions that have taken place at
No manual or campus report will reveal the

the University of Massachusetts since 1970.

one best way

to

conduct a presidential search.

How to do so is not easy to prescribe.

tell us a great deal about
what works and what doesn It is one thing to offer case illustrations ofpast events,
another to say how they might be put to use by other people in another era with quite

Suitably fleshed out, the events surrounding these five searches
't.

different situations

and

concerns. In evaluating these transitions

article also raises the question

of what

governance. The hard question for us

is

is

and leaderships,

this

the proper role of the president in university

not that the public land-grant university

is

an

of state government. It is, rather, How integral should it be? To the extent
that these examples provide for broad understandings of the system, they are valuable for
integral part

heuristic purposes.

When

a college or university president departs from office, the problem arises

of picking a successor. During this critical period of transition, the academic

community spends a great deal of time and emotional energy in trying to find a suitable replacement. Looking for the particular kind of leadership required is a very
challenging and difficult assignment. Because the presidency is conceived to be the
cardinal position in the academic enterprise, and as such the initiating and driving
force in the decision-making process, the trustees view the selection of a

dent as their ultimate responsibility. Within the total scheme of things,
the single most important act that they perform. For their part,
exercise in judgment. Nothing
sensitive politically.

As

is

more steeped

it is

new

it is

presi-

probably

a thoughtful

in institutional protocol

a result, the search for a chief executive officer

nor more
is

accorded

top priority and shrouded in relative secrecy.

From Henry Flagg

French,

who took office

in 1864, to

Elbert K. Fretwell, the cur-

men

have served as president of the University of Massachusetts. All have been white males, mostly of Anglo-Saxon Protestant extraction.

rent incumbent, twenty
1
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None

has been a

presidency.
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Be

woman

that as

it

or a person of color. Nor has a Catholic or a Jew held the
may, the achievements and careers of these presidents, and

the development of the office they served, provide a fascinating panorama of the
growth of the university. Evaluating the leadership of a single president is no simple
undertaking, and gathering evidence of changing conditions is infinitely more complicated. Fortunately, because of the limited scope of this inquiry, my task has been
greatly simplified.

Throughout

its

history, the office of president has gradually

increased in authority and prestige, although this has varied somewhat according to
the character and leadership style of each president.
In the years since a systemwide office of president

was created

for the University

of Massachusetts in 1969, there have been five presidential successions, each with

its

unique search. That there are differences between the five searches is hardly surprising, but those differences are complemented by a number of striking similarities.
Through a comparative examination of each, I have classified them accordingly: (1)
a corporate-style search; (2) an insider search; (3) a national search; (4) an heirapparent search; and (5) a politicized search. While not universal, these categories
are intended to illustrate the way presidential searches
at least at the University
shift with changing social, economic, and political conditions.
of Massachusetts
A special word: governors and legislative leaders, along with trustees, faculty, students, and alumni, react in some significantly similar ways to the problem of presi-

—

—

ways they perform in a markedly
manner. These wide disparities reflect sharply contrasting philosophies
about the sort of person needed as president and sharply contrasting methods of
selection. It is the purpose of this article to identify some of those variations and
similarities and suggest their importance for tomorrow's transitions in leadership.
dential succession, but in other equally significant
different

Background: Searching for Success

no magic formula

There

is

innate

wisdom and

for conducting a presidential search.

collective experience of those involved.

A lot depends on the

The procedures

are fairly

simple and straightforward. Ideally, the board of trustees appoints a broadly representative search committee,

whose primary function

is

to identify a pool of potential

prospects and narrow the field to a slate of finalists. Consultants

who

specialize in

executive recruiting are often hired to help in this endeavor. If compliance with

mative action does not always place the competition on a level playing
sionally gives constituencies the opportunity to

either a

woman, a black person, or

in various states

make

field, it

affir-

occa-

the claim of virtue by appointing

a Hispanic person.

Adherence

to the sunshine laws

guarantees the openness of the search and exposes

it

to full public

more problems than they solve. The search committee,
which is advisory in nature, eventually makes its recommendations to the appointing
authority. In the last stages of deciding among the serious contenders, the governing
view, but these statutes cause

board

selects the

person who,

Few contemporary

in their judgment,

is

best suited for the job.

searches follow this ideal. Many,

if not most, are beset with
can go wrong and often does. Mistakes and unforeseen circumstances are almost bound to occur. Some searches are disrupted by leaks
to the press and the hazards of premature publicity, while others suffer from politi-

tensions and controversy.

Much

cal intrusion and manipulation. Some suffer from the folly and foibles of human
judgment usually ending in dismal failure. This is what happens when the trustees

10

pick the

wrong incumbent, who

inevitably will prove unsuitable.

Still

other searches

are notably successful, resulting in an admirable choice that satisfies nearly every-

one. Failures are dramatic and illuminating; despite the best of intentions, the most
thoughtfully planned and carefully executed searches do not always succeed.

They provide a mandate or sense of
McLaughlin and David Riesman
Choosing a College President: Opportunities and

Successes, however, add to understanding.

legitimacy to the person chosen. In 1990, Judith

published a definitive study entitled
Constraints.

As

they argue, "The best searches serve to legitimate the final choice of

the search committee and trustees so that a

Many

to the presidency.
stituents

new

president can have a smooth entree

searches, however, are fraught with missteps that leave con-

on the campus enraged about the search and

hostile to

its

outcome. The

search ends up an abysmal failure, not because the wrong person has been chosen,

who might have been right for the institution is rendered inefby the traumas connected with his or her succession to the presidency." 3
McLaughlin and Riesman 's research included the investigation of more than two

but because someone
fective

hundred presidential searches. During the ten years of their collaborative effort,
they interviewed numerous presidential candidates and search committee members,
including trustees, faculty, students, and alumni. Their comparative study covers a
public and private, large
broad spectrum of American colleges and universities
and small
along with a good geographical spread. Throughout their book, the

—

—

authors discuss questions about the search process, such as

how members

of the

what procedures help prevent breaches of confidentiality, and how search committees go about
choosing a consultant and evaluating candidates. All in all, they are persuaded that
the search process at many public and private institutions more closely resembles a
search committee are chosen, what committee size

political contest

This situation

is

most

desirable,

than the corporate method of picking a chief executive officer.
is

especially true in Massachusetts,

One would be hard

which

is

a highly political state.

pressed to find a state where the battles in public higher educa-

waged more fiercely. These conflicts are characterized by intense competition
from the private schools and by the underlying issues of money, class, and ethnicity.
Historically, the prestigious elite institutions have always held a most favored position. Their hegemony can be attributed in large part to the fact that the state legislature had subsidized Harvard as a provincial college over two hundred years before
4
the publics came into existence. Consequently, the latter have always been treated
as "academic orphans," to use Charles Radin's felicitous phrase. In his words, "Public higher education in Massachusetts got a late, weak start. Born in the shadow of
Harvard, its development was hampered at every subsequent stage by the dominance of Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and by the struggle
of institutions such as Boston University and Boston College to develop themselves." 5
Unless one understands these dynamics, one cannot fully comprehend or appreciate
the policy environment in which the scrappy battles are fought.
tion are

It is

tion

is

natural then to ask:

Do searches

really

make

a difference? This central ques-

addressed squarely by McLaughlin and Riesman. They frame their question

more broadly by asking
Just as there

a series of other related questions.

whether presidents make a difference, so there is
Can a search be organized
identify the person most appropriate for the institution? Does a

is

argument as

to

corresponding debate as to whether searches matter.
so that

it

will

11
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"good" search produce a "good" president? Or is the outcome of a search
random? Is the search merely a ceremonial activity, having little or
no bearing on the quality of the person selected at its conclusion? 6
basically

The answers

to these questions not only

convey important messages about the

obligations of trustees to each other and to the faculty, students, and alumni, but

they also require us to think hard about the role of the search

itself.

How does

one predict the future leadership potential of a particular candidate? The

relative

effectiveness of a president's leadership involves such things as his or her personal
qualities, his

formal as well as informal authority, his communication

skills,

the

commands both
inside and outside the academic community. Indeed, the modern president is as
much a power broker as he is an overseer of administrative operations. As one
UMass report says, "The president's role is enormously varied, especially in a multireputation he acquires, the funds he raises, and the respect he

campus system. He

is

part leader, part diplomat, part broker, part manager, part

commander, part spokesman, and part of many other
Whether a president will prevail in a dispute over policy (or even

negotiator, part cajoler, part
things as well."

7

whether he or she will be significantly involved) is the result of a subtle combination
of factors, not of any single determinant.
Contemporary presidents at UMass tend to remain in the job for a longer period
of time than many of their counterparts elsewhere. It is estimated that 40 percent
of college presidents nationwide have a tenure in office of about three years.
Burnout and political interference are the principal factors that account for the
high rate of turnover, which are aspects of the problem that make the search
doubly difficult.
Other factors include the fears of different groups that come into play. Suspicious
faculty members are often fearful of trustee collusion. They tend to be wary that the
selection may already be predetermined, or afraid that trustee priorities will be at
variance with theirs. By the same token, trustees tend to underestimate the pragmatism and common sense of faculty. Given the culture of the academy, faculty usually
prefer someone who has earned his or her professional spurs in academia. But faculty factions on most campuses are usually so fragmented that it is difficult for them
to achieve consensus on a specific candidate. The same sort of political fragmenta8
tion occurs among student and alumni groups.
It is well to remember that the search process is not an end in itself, but a means
to an end. This activity has many salutary effects in energizing trustees, faculty,
alumni, and students alike. A presidential transition provides them with a unique
opportunity for institutional learning. They must examine the problems and priorities the institution faces, consider what sort of leadership is desired, and evaluate the
credentials and experiences of candidates accordingly. There are also dangers, however. The most important of these is outside political interference that may rob the
academy of its autonomy. There is also a tendency to look for an absence of negatives in candidates rather than the presence of positives, which leaves the search
committee guessing about their real strengths and weaknesses.
Conditions and constituencies often change substantially between presidential
transitions. So even when we want to do better, we know less than we should about
what works and why. And what works in the private sector does not necessarily work
in the public sphere. Seeking an appropriate balance between process and outcome

12

is

a constant but healthy challenge. In the end, of course, that

the pivotal question

is

not what mistakes

we have made

is

what

in the past,

really matters:

but what

we

have learned from them.

The Development of the UMass System

Founded

in

1863 at the height of the Civil War, the state university began as an agriwhen Massachusetts was primarily a farm state. year earlier, Ver-

A

cultural school,

mont's Justin Morrill had sponsored a bill in Congress to grant public lands to the
states for the promotion of higher education in "agriculture and the mechanic arts."

The second mission of this dual federal mandate was assigned to MIT. The success
of the land-grant college movement was attested by the later development of firstclass institutions in many states and world-famous universities at Berkeley, Ithaca,
Madison, Minneapolis, and Urbana.
The trustees in Massachusetts appointed Henry Flagg French as the first president
on November 29, 1864. They chose rural Amherst as the site for the new school, and
classes began in the fall of 1867. Popularly known as Mass Aggie, the fledgling institution remained a relatively small but important school for nearly seventy years. In
the late nineteenth century, nine field research and experiment stations were set up
across the commonwealth from Deerfield to Nantucket. Under the presidency of

Kenyon

Butterfield (1906-1924), the cooperative extension service flourished in

and provided technical assistance to countless farmers and their families.
become president of Michigan State University.
In 1931, when Roscoe Thatcher presided over the agricultural school, it was
upgraded to the rank of a state college. In 1947, when Ralph Van Meter was at the
helm, it emerged as a full-fledged university. By this time, however, Massachusetts
ceased to be a farm state. With the onrush of urban industrialism and the rapid
growth of its cities, its people had become more urban than rural.
After World War II, change came rapidly. Returning military veterans, with their
GI benefits, provided the first large influx of students. Andrew Greeley points out in
his memoir, "The Crooked Lines of God," that the GI Bill brought Irish and Italian
young people to college in as high, or higher, numbers as any ethnic group. A generation later, their college-age sons and daughters followed in their footsteps. These
demographics profoundly altered campus life.
By the end of the 1960s, the land-grant university had grown in size and prominence. Enrollment figures had more than tripled. Several academic departments at
Amherst gained national distinction, and the number of graduate programs increased
sharply. A new urban commuter campus opened at Boston in the fall of 1965, when
the tidal wave of high school graduates was at its crest and the need to provide quality liberal arts education at low cost at its strongest. During this era of euphoria the
original academic plans of the Boston campus were formulated as six colleges of a
size intended to provide some intimacy and largely established on the traditional liberal arts pattern. At the same time, a medical school was being built in Worcester and
admitted its first class of sixteen students in 1970. With this enormous growth came
an increased diversity of students and faculty.
In 1969, the UMass board of trustees followed the recommendations of the Marcus
report and restructured the university into a system of co-equal campuses. This reorganization placed the president in overall charge of the system and made the chancelrural areas

In 1924, Butterfield left to

13
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managing their own respective campuses. Up to this point, both
Boston and Worcester had operated as branch campuses with the direction and control flowing from the original "flagship" campus at Amherst. The location of the president's office was shifted in 1970 from Amherst to Boston, which is the capital city and
lors responsible for

the locus of political

power

in the state.

A decade later, in 1983, Boston State Teachers

College was merged with UMass/Boston. In July 1991, the state legislature passed a
reorganization
sity

bill

that

added two more free-standing public

universities, the

Univer-

of Lowell and Southeastern Massachusetts University, to the multicampus system.

This latest consolidation, which unified the entire public university sector in Massachusetts, enlarged the system to five campuses.

the board of regents and replaced

it

The same

statute also abolished

with a higher education coordinating council. 9

This brief chronicled history provides a broad overview of the institutional mosaic

and

sets the stage for exploring the period

A Corporate Old-Boy

under consideration.

Search

In 1969-1970, the university conducted a search for a successor to John Lederle, who
had been president for ten years and was soon to retire. As it turned out, this search
was characterized by two separate and simultaneous activities. Because the board of
trustees assumed that the selection was exclusively their prerogative, they began the
search process in a manner marked by informality and discretion: two hallmarks of
corporate executive recruitment that academe adopted as its own. At the same time,
the faculty at Amherst began a search process that was more open and democratic.
The trustees hoped to recruit an academic star who would bring the university
greater academic respectability, perhaps someone with national stature and visibility. While scouting around for such prospects, they focused their attention primarily
on Robert C. Wood, an MIT professor of political science with a national reputation. Wood was a very bright, hard-driven, and ambitious person. He had recently
worked in Washington as under secretary and then as secretary of HUD in the
Lyndon B. Johnson administration. A vigorously public man, Wood first learned the
ways of the political world while working as an assistant auditor in the Florida state
government. Later he worked as a management organization expert in the federal
bureau of the budget in the Harry Truman administration and as a housing expert in
the John F. Kennedy administration. So he had a practical as well as a theoretical
knowledge of politics. 10
The son of a traveling shoe salesman, Robert Wood was born in Saint Louis,
Missouri, and grew up in Jacksonville, Florida, where he attended public schools.
He then went to Princeton, which introduced him to the cultural elitism of the Ivy
League
something new for this southern young man who was more used to life as
a street fighter. After World War II, in which he served as an army sergeant, he went
to Harvard, where he earned a master's degree in public administration and a doctorate in political economy.
Returning to Cambridge in 1969 from his Washington sojourn, he reentered
academe by resuming his duties as chairman of the Political Science Department at
MIT and director of the Harvard-MIT Joint Center for Urban Studies. Governor
Francis Sargent soon appointed him chairman of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority. In spite of these diverse assignments, Wood found the readjustment

—

to

be

trying.

14

Prior to

Wood's return

to the Northeast, three years earlier, in late 1967,

UMass

Robert Gordon and president John Lederle had flown to Washington to see
if they could interest Wood in the chancellorship at the Boston campus. But Wood
was totally absorbed in helping Lyndon Johnson design and implement his Great
Society programs. Spurning their overtures, he turned them down flatly. His work in
Washington was too important for him to leave.
But this rebuff did not cool the ardor of trustee Bob Gordon, who continued his
energetic courtship of Wood. During the late winter of 1970, Gordon visited Wood
again to see if he could interest him in taking on the presidency. As residents in the
town of Lincoln, the two men had known each other since the mid-1950s. Gordon
informed Wood that Lederle, who had devised the strategy of growth at the university during the 1960s, would soon announce his intention to retire. This courting,
unlike the previous one, rekindled Wood's enthusiasm. He was restless at MIT and
did not want to become strictly a fund-raiser.
When Wood first began to consider the UMass presidency, he explored the position very carefully. He talked with James Killian, who was chairman of the board of
trustees at MIT. As a favor to Wood, Killian visited the Amherst campus for the purpose of checking it out for him. This was an intriguing way of learning about an institution without lifting the veil of confidentiality. Killian came back favorably impressed
both with the caliber of its faculty and with the quality of its science and engineering
programs. He told Wood that he was particularly impressed with the recognition the
faculty had achieved in the field of polymer sciences. Their conversation convinced
trustee

Wood that UMass could

quickly

become

a

much more

nationally visible institution,

had already achieved and the willingness of the state legislature to provide the necessary funding. With the emerging campuses at Boston
and Worcester, it showed greater growth potential and a special capacity to do
even better.
Wood signaled Gordon that he would be interested in talking about the job. Gordon
then introduced him to Joseph Healey, who was chairman of the board of trustees.
thanks to the distinction

it

11

men discussed the position during lunch at the Marriott Hotel in
Newton. Healey was very persuasive and so was Gordon. After lunch, Wood indicated that he wanted to talk to his wife, Peggy, and to think about it some more, but
he was very attracted to the idea of taking on this new responsibility. Moreover,
because he was assured that the president's office would be located in Boston, the
thought of their not having to move another time was appealing to them. One of the
most attractive features of the job was the opportunity to work with leaders in other
fields and to shape public policy.
A few days after the meeting, Wood contacted Healey and told him that he would
be interested. Healey then arranged for a meeting with the executive committee of
the board at the Parker House in Boston. They talked at great length and got along
well, after which the committee was ready to go to the board. That night, Healey
called Wood to say that if he was willing to accept the presidency, they could talk
about specific terms. And so they did. They offered him a starting salary of $50,000.
At the next meeting of the full board, on May 13, 1970, Wood was named president
of the University of Massachusetts. The vote was unanimous.
Meanwhile, no one had informed Wood about the ongoing search at Amherst.
Once he learned that a search committee existed, he immediately decided to go
meet with the faculty. In the meantime, the story of his selection broke in the press
Together, the three

75
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before

Wood could have this meeting. The situation was as embarrassing as it was
Wood later described the cold reception he received from the faculty:

awkward.

Now all that

no one had told me that there was a search committee going
was strongly represented on the search committee, and
particularly the Amherst campus. There had been a sociologist who had been a
faculty advisor to the committee. He was Charles Paige and his specialty was
sports sociology and he was an able counsellor. Anyway, he had not been consulted and apparently the search committee continued to identify people and I
had never met them. In the meantime, I said that I'd be glad to be part of the
university and to take the presidency, and the executive committee so voted.
But the fact remains that I still had not met a search committee and they were
quite angry. Healey phoned me to tell me about them after the news had come
out, and I said that maybe I'd better meet with them. I had an engagement down
at Yale in their urban studies program with Kingman Brewster, so I drove up to
the campus. Oswald Tippo who was then chancellor, put me up in a small motel
near campus and I went in to see a very frosty and very cold search committee. I
think Professor Stone, the great mathematician, was either on it or the chairman
of it and the first question was, "What is your concept of the university?" And it
was as if we were playing a record prior to any recommendation.
At any rate, that was a complication, reflective probably of Joe Healey's style
of liking to work informally and getting everything settled before the formal
mechanisms had finished their work. And I became his great admirer for the
eight years that I worked with Healey during some turbulent times. But nonethe12
less, from the Amherst perspective, it started my time off on an awkward foot.
on and

time,

that the faculty

,

faculty search. The board
an excellent president for the university.
Their preemptive action caused suspicion and mistrust. Also not surprisingly, the
Amherst faculty felt betrayed and immediately protested. Years later, reflecting on
how the trustees had handled the matter, Chairman Healey reportedly exclaimed,
"We did it backwards. We got the right guy, but the wrong way." 13 When Wood was
appointed president in mid-May, the trustee meeting was picketed by students
protesting his stance on Vietnam and by people protesting the bad service on the
MBTA's Green Line. Many faculty thought that Wood had obtained the job solely
because of his friendship with powerful leaders in the state. Uppermost in their
minds was Joe Healey's close identification with the Kennedys, the dominant political family in Massachusetts. Wood was one of the few Cambridge intellectuals who
had supported Edward Kennedy for the U.S. Senate in 1962 and continued to main-

Not

surprisingly, the trustees

simply decided that

tain a relationship

had abruptly halted the

Wood would make

based upon mutual high esteem.

A Transformational

Leader

Anxious to get to work, Wood took office on July 1. He brought to the presidency an
unusual combination of talents and a grand concept of what he intended to do. He was
formally installed as president on December 9, 1970, at the Statler-Hilton Hotel in
Boston. In his inaugural address, Wood asserted that he had no desire to lead "cookiecutter campuses" and called for substantial autonomy and flexibility in developing academic goals and missions. Although Wood was animated by this vision, the issue of
whether he adhered to such an approach would soon become a matter of intense debate.

16

Wood had

the personal qualities indispensable to leadership

—

a driving will to

succeed, the capacity to inspire loyalty, the ability to communicate, and a genuine
interest in people.

side people

who

He assembled

an unusual

staff,

which caused some concern. OutNan Robinson, Peter

lacked previous academic experience, like

Edelman, and Edward Lashman, were brought

in.

This recruitment pattern stood

sharp contrast to that of Ernest Lynton, the vice president for academic

in

who
The

affairs,

had had an adventurous experience as dean at Livingston College of Rutgers.
staff was fiercely competitive, yet they got along well and were of central significance
14
to Wood's success.
Wood quickly moved to center stage and emerged as one of the most influential
national players in public higher education.

who

A tireless president with a first-rate

and pursued them relentlessly, he pressed his faculty
hard and worked his staff to exhaustion. Moreover, his political instincts were extraordinary. He possessed a shrewd sense of political maneuvering, inherited, no doubt,
from his experiences in Washington, where he had built a reputation for political
acumen. On top of all his other duties, he managed to teach an undergraduate seminar in urban politics. Few university presidents keep in touch with students through
teaching the way he did.
mind, one

Initially,

set his goals

Wood

enjoyed

much

success.

— on the future directions

He made

a series of

moves

— some highly

which he thought the university should be
headed. In 1971, he appointed a special blue ribbon committee to examine the uni15
versity's role in modern society and lay the groundwork for executive action.
Laudable in its intent, the committee's subsequent report was controversial and
was greeted by faculty with healthy skepticism. Nevertheless, Wood used it to great
advantage. Armed with the committee's recommendations, he helped pave the way
for the university's transformation into a major academic institution. In all, he was
seen as a master builder who played by his own set of rules.
But the rules of the game were soon to change as the college-age population
began to change. Preoccupied during the 1970s with the tasks of restoring campus
peace, sorting out student demands, and reuniting fiercely divided faculties, Wood
was quick to recognize that the demographic prospects were unpromising. Demographic changes meant smaller numbers in the college-age population. Enrollment
projections based on the 1970 census data contributed to decisions to scale down
the size of the campuses. In place of a projected 40,000 enrollment at Amherst, the
trustees fixed a ceiling of 25,000. They likewise modified the planned size of the
Boston campus from 15,000 to 12,500.
Undaunted by this, Wood pushed for curriculum reform and launched a broad
range of innovative academic initiatives designed to improved the undergraduate
learning experience. Student internships flourished, as did field-based education
projects such as the University Year for Action Program and the University Without Walls. One such innovation was the creation of a College of Public and Community Service in Boston. Although these educational programs broke new ground,
they also upset traditional faculty, who were concerned about maintaining academic
standards and the limits of the university's service capacity. Occasionally, in his
haste to get his "ducks in line," Wood grew impatient with delay and ran roughshod
over the formalities of university governance. On some issues he met firm resistance from faculty leaders, but he usually got his way in the end. Yet the price
exacted proved costly.
publicized

in

17
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Despite quarrels with his chancellors,
the university and used

it

Wood profited from the

as a convenient excuse for centralizing

expanding

power

mode

of

in the presi-

growing criticism of his heavy-handed style of management, he justified this centralization by saying, "I believe that academic missions
properly begin at the initiative of the campuses, subject to availability of resources
and to considerations of redundancy. I appreciate that no academic community
places high priority on administrative activities, but I am persuaded that effective
administration can do much to improve academic performance and enrich the lives
dent's office.

To

offset the

of students and faculty alike." 16

Beset with conflicting demands,

Wood pulled off a major coup

for the university by

bringing the Boston and Worcester campuses on line well ahead of schedule. Con-

cern for the university's neighbors in both

cities led to decisions that

made

impact on the surrounding neighborhoods and
needs. While working at

softened campus

responsive to local community

HUD during the mid-1960s, Wood had experienced first-

hand the consequences of what had happened
state

it

New Jersey when the trustees of its
in Newark. He was

in

medical college failed to reach out to the black community

determined not to make the same mistake in Massachusetts. As an expert in housing
and urban renewal, he engineered plans for redeveloping the Columbia Point peninsula, the site of the Boston campus, and for converting its beleaguered public housing
project into a mixed-income family development.
savvy mix of city planning and

A

community opposition.
As a veteran of the Great Society programs, Wood was process

good public

relations helped to defuse

oriented. In 1972,

he appointed a group of senior faculty to study university governance. Headed by
Professor Robert Wellman, this group produced some workmanlike procedural
results. They drafted a plan that outlined areas of primary responsibility for initiating
17
action and for faculty consultation and participation in governance. The trustees
adopted the Wellman report on April 4, 1973. The language of this trustee document
with regard to conducting presidential searches

When

is

quite specific.

It

reads as follows:

appointing the president, the board will seek nominations from a broadly

The board will determine the charge to and composition of the search committee after seeking the
recommendations of the appropriate campus governing body(s) and, when
appropriate, other components of the university. The board will appoint faculty
and student representatives to the search committee upon nomination by the
representative search committee appointed by the board.

appropriate governing body(s). 18

Meanwhile, by the mid-1970s, with the Arab oil embargo and soaring inflation, surrounding conditions began to change dramatically. The state faced a serious economic
downturn. University expansion suddenly turned into university retrenchment. In

November

1974, Michael Dukakis, a liberal reform Democrat, defeated the Republi-

can incumbent Frank Sargent for the governorship. During

his election campaign,
Dukakis announced that he intended to cut 30 percent from the public higher education budget, news that distressed Wood. On December 12, 1974, Wood spoke out on
the issue and declared that adoption of the proposed budget would "strike at the heart
of the university." In keeping with his style, he did not intend to let this happen and

decided to fight back.

Wood took him on when he insisted on
He found Dukakis adamant and unwilling to

Desiring to confront Dukakis directly,

imposing across-the-board budget

cuts.
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compromise in the least. The two adversaries began to wage a fierce budget battle.
Wood saw the episode as a substantial effort to subvert the fiscal autonomy and independence of the university and to bring it under the direct control of the executive
branch of state government. Adept at political bargaining and compromising, he reluctantly yielded to administration pressure and reduced the original budget request of
$118 million to a bare-bones request of $103 million. The Dukakis administration recommended $90 million, a budget which, if enacted, would have required major layoffs
and program curtailments. Maneuvering behind the scenes and contacting other
Democratic party leaders, Wood managed to get most of these cuts restored by the
legislature, which passed an appropriation of $101 million.
This did not end the matter. The outcome of the budget battle placed the governor's office on the defensive against what it perceived as an expansionist university.
Wood saw the executive incursion as political interference and questioned the governor's commitment to public higher education. This conflict put them on a collision
course. At the time, the salient question was, Who has the power? Dukakis could ill
afford to be upstaged by a university president. To recoup his position, he needed to
teach Wood a lesson and assert executive control. It was a rivalry of gigantic dimensions that was played out in the public realm.
Another sore spot was the luxurious suite of offices that Wood maintained at One
Washington Mall (at an annual rental of $146,000), something that irritated the parsimonious Dukakis, who rode the subway to work. Students complained vociferously
that while their educational programs were being cut, Wood continued to sit in the lap
of luxury. This issue escalated when the Boston campus moved into its new facilities at
Columbia Point, thereby leaving the vacated building at Boston's Park Square with
plenty of space available for the president's office. Nevertheless,

Wood stubbornly

refused to give up his Washington Mall offices on the grounds of fiscal autonomy and
a valid lease. Such goading
this

controversy even

made Dukakis

more than the

furious.

Dynamic personalities polarized
It is worth remembering that

situation warranted.

disputes over offices and presidential mansions have been a characteristic source of

unseating or unsettling presidents.

Despite these troubles,

Kennedy Corporation

Wood scored a second major coup by persuading the

John F. Kennedy presidential library at Columbia
it was originally scheduled to be erected. For several years the project had been thwarted by resisting local groups in Cambridge, which
complained about the traffic congestion that it would cause. While Harvard dallied,
to build the

Point instead of at Harvard, where

Wood acted. He not only brought Jacqueline
at sunset,

Bank

in

Onassis to view the oceanfront location

upon Robert McNamara at the World
and convinced him that the site would make a fitting memorial

but also paid a well-publicized

call

New York City
Wood saw the favorable decision as a catalyst for the

for the slain president.

develop-

ment of programs related to public policy at the Boston campus as well as offering the
prospect for new development to the entire peninsula.
Emboldened by success, Wood enjoyed exercising power and knew how to use it.
He allied himself with local politicians and was not unwilling to utilize patronage to
achieve his ends. Bitter toward a governor who did not assign a higher priority to the
land-grant university, he went over his head and appealed for public support. In the

eyes of Dukakis, however,

Wood seemed overly ambitious and

desirous of too

much

power. Their already impaired relations were not improved by Wood's support for a
plan to reorganize higher education, which was sponsored by Senate president Kevin

19

New England Journal of Public

Policy

Harrington. These two disgruntled leaders represented the foremost political dangers

Of the

seemed
nominee for governor in 1978. Liberal Democrats,
like state representative Barney Frank, were outraged by the behavior of their party
leader. They did not intend to let Dukakis forget that he owed his election mostly to
them. In a stinging rebuke, Frank chastised the governor by calling him "the perfect
political ingrate." While Dukakis was perceived by the electorate as a liberal, it is not
to Dukakis.

likely to

become

entirely clear that

In

March

two, Harrington posed the greater threat because he

the Democratic

he played a

1976, in

liberal role in all this.

keeping with

his process

mode,

Wood organized a forum of the

higher education establishment in an effort to achieve consensus on reorganization.

He

lobbied hard for Harrington's plan, which was opposed by John Silber, the president of

Boston University, who hoped to obtain public funds for private schools. At this point,
Dukakis suspected that Wood wanted to become the czar of public higher education. The
governor tried in vain to promote

his

gling, including accusations against

with both plans being shelved.

own reorganization bill.

After

much public wran-

Wood for overreaching, the fight ended in a stalemate

The governor seemed

straightening things out, however, this indifference in

strangely indifferent. Instead of

some

respects

made them worse.

Wood had trouble dealing with Dukakis, the same cannot be said of his relations
with other leaders. He had the ability to work with partisans of a different persuasion
for the common cause. Not surprisingly, Wood struck a deal with John Silber and
If

worked with

private Catholic institutions like Boston College

and Holy Cross. 19 In

return for Silber's support of Harrington's reorganization plan,

Wood

agreed to hold

the development of graduate programs at the Boston campus. This action infuriated

members who had been recruited with the expectations of teaching at
They accused Wood of having "gone to bed" with Silber.
Meanwhile, trouble loomed at the Amherst campus. In what was described as a

many

faculty

the graduate level.

"love-hate relationship" between
stiff

resistance.

wrong

20

Some

Wood and the faculty,

of his difficulties

He

stemmed from

the president encountered

his

having gotten off on the

Oswald
Tippo in a running battle over the university budget. A former provost, Tippo, who
was cut from the "old aggie" mold, was a beloved figure on campus. He engaged in a
foot at the time of his search.

heated dispute with

Given the

also locked horns with Chancellor

Wood over the use of trust funds at the school of agriculture.
Wood hit an exposed institutional

university's strong tradition in this area,

nerve. This invoked a storm of protest and Tippo resigned in a huff. His resignation
triggered a rebellion against

Wood, who became

increasingly unpopular at the flagship

campus. This confrontation was as much an institutional struggle as it was a clash of
strong personalities. It was a classic case of the fear of change and what would happen

when funds were diverted.
More fundamentally, the Amherst faculty objected
21

to the president's centralization

Wood a
memo urging him to allow them more leeway in managing their own affairs and permit
of power and his micromanagement of the university. At one point they sent

campus autonomy and decentralization. 22 Beyond that, they suspected that
Wood suffered from Washington fever or what amounted to an infectious yearning to
move back on the national scene. From their perspective, he seemed more interested in
greater

pushing his
versity.

That

own political agenda than in promoting the academic missions

They viewed

Wood

of the uni-

his behavior as a threat to the stability of the institution.

aroused heated opposition at Amherst

considers the strong leadership he exercised.
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is

not surprising

when one

A vote of "no confidence" by its fac-

Wood to swallow an extra large slice of humble pie. This action undermined his presidency and hastened his demise. Yet Wood had always claimed that
he would stay in the job a minimum of five years and no longer than ten. After the
no-confidence vote his position became shakier than ever.
Almost simultaneously, Dukakis was close to gaining control of the board of
trustees. In the end, it was clear that the governor had the ultimate power. It seemed
only a matter of time before Wood would be removed. His ego bruised, he hoped to
ulty required

regain glory by entering the political arena and running against Dukakis for governor.

But

this spoiling strategy did

boom fizzled.

not work out for him. The attempt to promote a

Wood

Calculating that he could not stop Dukakis without raising substantial

campaign money, he decided to bow out gracefully. 23
In retrospect, Robert Wood was a venturesome and risk-taking president. In a bold
break with tradition, he blazed a new trail and made something different out of the
president's office
he turned it into a tool for vigorous leadership. Viewed in this
context, he was a transformational leader during a very turbulent era. As such, he was
regarded as one of the university's strongest presidents, a man who greatly enhanced
its reputation and quality.

—

Picking an Insider

When Wood submitted his letter of resignation on June

board of
and a different mode
of leadership. They agreed to recommend that an interim president be recruited
and take it on themselves to identify someone who would serve in this capacity. 24
In fact, they already had someone in mind
Franklin Patterson, a political scientist
who had served as secretary of the university since 1973. Because of his work with
the board, Patterson had gotten to know the trustees intimately. Obviously, he
had won their trust and confidence and was an alternative leader for them to put
17, 1977, the

trustees resorted to a different style of searching for a successor

—

in place.

Before coming to UMass, Patterson had taught

at

NYU and Tufts. He directed

the Lincoln Filene Center at Tufts, was the founding president of Hampshire College

(1966-1971), and board chairman there from 1971 to 1974. Drawing upon this experience, he

knew how to run

things during the interregnum.

In sounding out Patterson, board chairman Healey asked

him

if

interim presidency with the stipulation that he would be unable to

he could accept the

become

a candidate

had no problem in accepting this condition. 25
The rationale for exacting this limitation was to prevent an inside candidate from
gaining an unfair advantage over outside candidates. It was an important episode
because it set a precedent. 26 Patterson was named to the interim post without any
faculty consultation or participation. He declared that he would not be a candidate
for the permanent position. The trustees made the announcement quietly and as a
for the

fait

permanent

position. Patterson

accompli.

If

A

anyone could pacify the Dukakis trustees, Patterson was the man.
caretaker
he kept things running smoothly and did not go off in any wild directions.

executive,

made similar efforts to pacify other critics and to smooth ruffled feathers.
During his brief nine months in office, he maintained a steady course. Indeed, the
university did not lose any momentum while the trustees were searching for a
permanent replacement.
Patterson
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A Textbook National

Search

With Patterson securely at the helm, Chairman Healey saw no need to rush to appoint
a new president. Again the trustees adopted a different approach. The search officially
began with the establishment of an ad hoc committee headed by trustee Ruth Morgenthau. This small group of trustees, which met on June 25, 1977, was asked to draw
up the charge and composition of the search committee, plus a timetable for completing the search. They completed their assignment that same day.
Based on the advice of the Morgenthau committee, the board established a search
committee consisting of six trustees, three faculty members (one from each campus),
and two students (one from Amherst and one from Boston). In addition, there were
faculty advisory committees at each campus and student advisory committees at
Amherst and Boston. 27 Indeed, the trustees not only faithfully adhered to the spirit of
the

Wellman

report, but they also scrupulously followed the search procedures out-

lined in their governance document.

The 1978

began with high hopes of recruiting the "outstanding
nature of the constituencies had changed
dramatically. Stephen Breyer, a trustee and a faculty member at the Harvard Law
School, chaired the search committee. Instead of hiring an executive recruiting firm,
the trustees named Dorothy Marshall to serve as its senior consultant. She had extensive experience in academia as a professor at Bryn Mawr, as provost at UMass Boston,
and in recent years as a trustee of Bryn Mawr, Holy Cross, and Smith, where she
chaired the board. Obviously, Marshall did not need a "headhunter" to tell her and
the search committee where to look for possible candidates.
For his part, Breyer was a skilled chair in the activist mode. He threw himself into the
search with the requisite energy. Under his leadership, the search committee did its
own analysis of the major problems facing the university. They held hearings on each
campus, meeting with administrators, faculty members, and students. Based on what
they heard, they identified six problems: (1) level funding and the need to maintain
stable financial support; (2) the need for a planning process concerned with educational objectives and emerging from the university community, not simply reflecting
administration dictates; (3) the need for a president qualified to deal with collective
presidential search

candidates in the nation."

By

this time, the

bargaining; (4) the issue of reorganization of public higher education; (5) the relation-

between the public and private sectors in a period of declining enrollments and
and (6) the role of the medical school in providing health care in the
commonwealth. 28
After discussing these issues with the full board, the search committee developed a
set of qualifications for the new president. These included the ability to administer a
ship

financing;

$200-million-dollar budget, to
to obtain

manage

the educational responsibilities of the university,

governmental funding, and to relate to the private sector of higher education.

Meanwhile, the search committee was seeking to identify prospective candidates.
many educational institutions and placed advertising in leading
journals, including those aimed at women and minorities in higher education. It also
tracked prospects through a variety of networks, then actively sought them through
telephone calls and visits. These included both traditional and nontraditional networks. Such efforts involved meeting with officials of the Ford Foundation, the
State University of New York, the Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations, the Legal
It

sent letters to
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Defense Fund, and others. Moreover, committee members interviewed people from
the business, scientific, government, legal, and health communities. They made telephone calls to individuals who might provide additional information.
Their networking activity produced about 300 nominees, from whom they received
197 actual applicants. Some of the names that turned up were those of perennial
applicants. The search committee sifted through these files and reduced the field to
30. Since most of the 197 were not senior administrators, they were disposed of easily.
Visits were paid to individuals who could serve both as resources concerning academic
leadership and likely prospects for the presidency. Breyer and a few other committee
members flew to the West Coast and interviewed David Saxon, the president of the
University of California, and Albert Bowker, the chancellor at Berkeley. Neither of
them, however, showed any interest. They also contacted Vartan Gregorian, then
provost at the University of Pennsylvania, but he decided not to pursue the matter.
According to Richard Lyons, the Boston faculty member on the search committee,
these efforts were not very productive. He commented, "The smart ones detected
some structural difficulties inherent in the office and politely declined." 29 Such difficulties had to do mainly with the relationships of the presidency to the trustees and to the
Massachusetts board of higher education.
Despite these extensive efforts, many faculty members were sorely disappointed in
the list of candidate names because it was shy of college or university presidents. At
any rate, the search committee produced a short list of five candidates whom they considered serious contenders. These included Randolph Bromery, a black and chancellor at Amherst; Charles Foster, dean of the Forestry School at Yale; Marilyn Gittell,
associate provost at Brooklyn College; David Knapp, provost at Cornell; and James
Vorenberg, associate dean at Harvard Law School. With one minority and one female
candidate, this

list

barely

met

the affirmative action criteria. In late April, these final-

made campus visits and were

interviewed by various constituencies.
Lewis Mainzer, the Amherst faculty member on the search committee,
had contacted David Knapp to see if he might be interested. They had done their graduate work in political science together at the University of Chicago in the early 1950s.
Knapp initially said no, but later changed his mind, so he entered the search late. As a
late prospect, he had to have special qualities. He made a good impression on students
and alumni because they felt that they could trust him. Students sensed that Knapp
had an appropriate concern for the rising costs of education. He also had strong supporters among the Amherst faculty members on the advisory committee who felt that
he was a traditional academic who would give academic concerns top priority. In addition, they saw the Cornell provost as an academic insider, an experienced administra30
tor with a long record of accomplishment. The result was to place David Knapp
ists

Earlier,

among

the

finalists.

On May 13,

met for seven hours to consider the strengths and
While there was support for each of them, the consensus of
the committee was to recommend to the board the top three, namely, Marilyn Gittell,
David Knapp, and James Vorenberg. Some wished to offer all five names to the board
the search committee

weaknesses of the

finalists.

for consideration.

Two days later, on May 15, 1978, the full board met at Boston's Copley Plaza Hotel
make a final selection. They decided to consider the entire slate of finalists. After
Chairman Breyer gave a summary of the search, the trustees proceeded to a public

to
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discussion of the professional competence of the candidates, in which the latter were

Bromery was viewed as an insider who had dealt with many of the
some trustees believed that he had brought some problems on himself and had not handled others very successfully. It was a time for healing
and Bromery was not perceived as a unifying figure. There was little support for him at
openly

criticized.

issues facing the university, but

Amherst. Charles Foster, who previously served as a state cabinet member in environmental affairs, had sound experience as a public administrator, but he showed a basic
lack of curiosity and enthusiasm for the job. Both Foster and Bromery were eliminated
from further consideration.
Gittell, Knapp, and Vorenberg emerged as the front-runners. All three were praised
by their supporters. Marilyn Gittell, who came across as a sharp, lively, and intelligent
woman, conveyed the impression of very much wanting the president's job. In the
early 1970s, she

erupted in

had been involved

in the

Ocean Hill-Brownsville

controversy, which

New York City over the decentralization of its public schools. This dispute

had caused considerable tension between the black community and white Jewish
teachers. For her participation in this controversy, Gittell had encountered intense
opposition from the local teachers' union. A mover and shaker, she was a community
activist

who

activism.

strongly believed that scholarship should be used as a tool in social

With Mario

Fantini, she

was coauthor of a

left-liberal critique

of urban public

Her experience at Brooklyn College made her receptive to the idea of
open admissions. To some members of the committee, Gittell appeared brash and
education.

31

which split along the lines of
saw her essentially as a female

aggressive. In fact, she polarized the search committee,

the old guard versus the Dukakis loyalists.

version of

The

latter

Bob Wood.

A promising candidate and faculty colleague of Breyer's at Harvard Law School,
James Vorenberg had organized the Watergate
Archibald Cox.

special prosecution force

He impressed everyone with his intellect and

ability,

under

but some

felt that

he was disappointing in the interview. Vorenberg did not have a good sense of the university, nor did he seem anxious to tackle the job.
Given his strong base of faculty support, Knapp became a late favorite because he

had covered so much administrative terrain in his years at Cornell as provost and as
dean of the College of Human Ecology. Before then, he had spent ten years at the
University of New Hampshire as a professor of government, assistant to the president,
and dean of the College of Liberal Arts. While having dinner with the search committee at the 57 Restaurant in Boston, he had had a good discussion with them and later
with the full board. The following day, trustee Paul Marks had taken Knapp to meet
with Governor Dukakis, who inquired whether "this one" was their choice.
The main dynamic operating here was to avoid a repetition of Bob Wood. The political backlash was strong, especially among the Dukakis trustees. Such a reaction to a
predecessor president is not unusual. As McLaughlin and Riesman remind us, "If this
president was beloved, his or her clone is desired. If the president was unpopular, his
or her opposite is sought: a calm, conservative individual if the former president was
regarded as pressing the faculty too hard or being too flamboyant or eccentric, or an
'exciting' figure if the past president

seemed

dull or staid."
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After the trustees finished discussing the character and reputation of the candidates

returned to open meeting. Chairman Healey then stated
was objection, the vote for president would be taken by secret ballot,
a move that would come back to haunt them. There was no objection. This was the

in executive session, they
that, unless there

24

procedure traditionally used by the board for matters of great moment. Furthermore,
the legality of this procedure had been upheld by Attorney General Edward Brooke
in

1965 in a formal opinion concerning the board's voting by secret ballot

Worcester as the

Of the

site for

in selecting

the medical school.

were eligible to vote. On the first ballot, the
Vorenberg 1. On the second ballot, Gittell
Stephen Breyer then moved to elect Knapp by accla-

trustees in attendance, twenty

count was Bromery

2, Gittell 7,

received 8 votes and

Knapp

12.

Knapp

10,

33
mation, and his motion passed unanimously.

After the trustees had made their selection, Breyer telephoned Knapp and offered
him the job. He wanted an immediate yes or no answer. There was a sense of urgency
34
in Breyer's voice, which no doubt reflected the political division on the board. His
appointment was the last fling of the old guard. In the negotiations that followed,
about the same
Knapp was offered a salary of $58,000, plus a housing allowance
compensation he had received as provost at Cornell.
The secret ballot was a mistake on the trustees' part because of statutory changes
since the attorney general's 1965 opinion. Their vote was promptly challenged by the
Associated Press, which filed a complaint that the trustees had violated the state's
open-meeting law. The issue, however, was settled out of court. As part of the settlement, the trustees agreed to a roll call vote in open meeting, whereupon Knapp picked
up an extra vote that was in dispute.

—

A Professional Academic Administrator
An

academic

traditionalist,

David Knapp considered himself to be a pragmatic

ideal-

He was no Robert Wood. The two men were a study in contrasts. In many respects
Knapp was the antithesis of all that Wood represented. He was essentially a quiet,
scholarly man who listened well. He was less flamboyant and aggressive. Knapp was
ist.

always gentle and soft-spoken in his dealings with people. While he was less of a com-

municator and much

he understood the inner workings of the university
shared anything in common, it was that they
were both political scientists and both cared deeply about their children. 35 Although
Knapp was utterly different in personality and outlook from Wood, he was neverthebetter than

less personal,

Wood did.

If

the two

men

less similar in the sense that he, too, became a very effective leader. Paradoxically,
Wood's legacy both helped and hurt him.
At the time of his inaugural, which was held at historic Faneuil Hall in Boston on

October 29, 1978, Knapp frankly confessed that if he survived the presidency for ten
he would consider himself a success. He was first and foremost a professional
academic administrator. As a person who had come up through the ranks in academia,
he was the quintessential insider, seeing himself as an integral part of the institution.
While he had less natural ability than Wood in dealing with conflict over turf issues, he
knew instinctively how the academy works. He was a most unusual man, efficient at his
work, a quality one might expect from a highly capable administrator. He knew how to
make choices and put together a cohesive multicampus system. This is where he made
his mark and must be judged accordingly.
Faced during his first days in office with the same problem that had wrecked the
Wood administration, Knapp was determined that it not ruin his. He soon became

years,

convinced that the dispersal of power was necessary, useful, and desirable. Quickly
grasping the situation, he responded by decentralizing university governance. Steering
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on the desire

clear of any conflict

and

the university, in his

own words, "an academic institution, where academic values had

36
top priority."

As

fate

capitalizing

would have

it,

for stability, he set about

he assumed office

in the throes

making

of state elec-

toral change.

was defeated for the Democratic gubernatonomination in a startling political upset by the upstart Edward King in a bitter
party primary. King then went on to win the governorship against the Republican canIn September 1978, Michael Dukakis

rial

didate, Frank Hatch. The circumstances at the corner office of the State House had
changed dramatically. The mood of the times was also partly responsible. No longer
was the university being disrupted by antiwar protests and campus disorders.

Most

large public organizations experience cycles of administrative centralization

own counterKnapp experihe had recruited a new

and decentralization that succeed each other regularly and produce
effects. It is true

enced

this

of

all

their

massive bureaucracies, including the university.

phenomenon

in

many

different ways. Before long,

team of chancellors and given them plenty of room to maneuver. These included
Henry Koffier at Amherst, Robert Corrigan at Boston, and Robert Tranquada at
Worcester. 37 True to form, Knapp showed a great deal of respect for both faculty and
institutional autonomy. Indeed, he was much more of a team player than Bob Wood.
He delegated responsibility and much discretion
some thought too much
to certain of his subordinates. As might be expected under these circumstances, the campus
chancellors asserted strong leadership in managing their own campuses. They did not
always cooperate with one another or with the president.
Despite his efforts to decentralize, Knapp was soon forced to assume a defensive
posture. In 1980, state senator Chester Atkins, who chaired the Senate Ways and
Means Committee, cut the funding for the president's office by 50 percent. This hostile legislative action prompted the resignation of senior vice president Ernest Lynton
in protest. He believed that the debilitating budget reduction would make it extremely
difficult, if not impossible, for the president's office to function properly and viewed
these formidable constraints as punitive and unwarranted. 38
This disturbing development was an accurate omen of things to come. When Atkins

—

—

final touches to the appropriations bill for 1981, he attached "an outside secwhich created the powerful state board of regents. This peculiar legislation also
abolished the board of higher education along with the governing boards for the state
colleges and the community colleges. This sweeping change not only superimposed a
new layer of bureaucracy, but also submerged the authority of the UMass trustees in a
complex maze of bureaucratic power. Such centralization came in stages. Working
with a board of regents commonly regarded as authoritative, Knapp and the trustees
found themselves acting as a rubber stamp for many of its policies. Frustrated in their
attempts to maintain their own autonomy, they chafed under these institutional
arrangements. Virtually every key decision they made was second-guessed by one state
agency or another. Faced with this kind of bureaucratic nightmare, it was little wonder

put the
tion,"

that the trustees felt "impotent."

Meanwhile,

in the fall

39

of 1982, Michael Dukakis had regained the governorship.

Ed King in a much publicized "rematch" that
two of them against each other in another bitter Democratic primary. With
the resurgence of the economy and the birth of the so-called Massachusetts miracle,
tax revenues gradually replenished the state treasury. The whole dynamic had changed.
Prior to that, he had beaten his nemesis

pitted the

26

No longer was the question Who has the power?

but rather

Who has the money?

Unlike Wood, Knapp did not present a personal threat to Dukakis and was no match
for the governor in the

game of politics. Nor

did he pretend to be.

He

chose the safer

course of conciliation and nonconfrontation, another important difference between

Knapp and Wood

as university leaders.

With the board of regents

many politicians concluded

in control of the entire public higher

education system,

was no longer needed. This is
about the only reasonable explanation for the sporadic sorties that were made to disband the office. Chester Atkins, who was also chairman of the state Democratic Party,
led the assault. Even state senator John Olver, who had once taught chemistry at
UMass/Amherst, wanted to abolish the president's office. The motive force of this
drive was the concentration of power in the board of regents. These crosscutting pressures made Knapp's life miserable, but he endured them for several more years. As a
pragmatic realist, he reluctantly accepted what had to be accepted.
Despite all this, Knapp steered a steady course. His accomplishments were many.
Foremost among these would be the creation of the Center for Polymer Science
Research at Amherst and the Biotechnology Research Park at Worcester. Under his
that the president's office

became an internationally recognized research institution
component of the state's economic development efforts. Through his
tenure at Cornell and the University of New Hampshire, Knapp fully understood the
40
land-grant mission and fostered a wide range of public service activities. He spearheaded pioneering efforts in industry-university partnerships and the development
leadership the university

and an

integral

He oversaw the initial steps in building
and the development of modern computerized
management information systems and a state-of-the-art telecommunications system.
Concerned about education at all levels, Knapp emphasized the need for collaboration with the Boston public schools and helped produce a breakthrough on graduate
education at the Boston campus. He also actively supported faculty and student
41
foreign exchange programs.
These halcyon days in the mid-1980s seemed to mark a pinnacle of UMass success.
Its academic reputation continued to improve, as evidenced by the quality of its undergraduate applications, the academic achievements of its student body, and its ability to
attract faculty of the highest caliber. By 1986, the Boston campus was listed in Time
magazine as one of the nine "hot colleges" in the country. Similarly, the Amherst
campus had improved its image from a three-star to a four-star university in the 1988
edition of Edward Fiske's "A Guide to Colleges." This ranking was based on the quality of its academic, social, and campus life. It had surpassed both Penn State and the
University of Maryland. The most dramatic change at the university came in the area
of increased salaries for faculty and administrators. Over 200 faculty members earned
in excess of $60,000. In August 1987, the trustees approved a $20,000 pay raise for
Knapp, which brought his annual salary to $119,000. 42
Despite its increasing national recognition and growing attraction to students,
Knapp knew that the institution still had a long way to go if it was to become a worldclass university. In 1988, he persuaded the trustees to appoint the special blue ribbon
Saxon Commission, which outlined a plan for achieving this goal. As they took stock of
the situation, they realized that it would require a bold strategy to overcome the
of corporate relations and patent policies.
private support for the university

bureaucratic stranglehold of the regents. In order to
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make

the state university truly
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independent and internationally competitive, they recommended the merger of the
three existing public universities along with a formula for stable funding and greater

autonomy. 43 They spent a year working on the assignment.
No sooner had the Saxon Report rolled off the presses in March of 1989 when
Franklyn Jenifer, the regents chancellor, came out with a plan of his own. This preemptive strike was a blatant attempt to circumvent the work of the Saxon Commistrustee

sion.

Knapp was

appalled. In a rare display of public anger, he spoke out

on the

issue

saying,"The regents' proposal in no way changes the current system of centralized gov-

weak boards

it would carry centralization furup the University of Massachusetts
system. It would isolate the Boston campus under a weak board of trustees, and make
44
the Medical Center a branch of the Amherst campus." Chancellor Jenifer's counterplan, which was put together in three weeks, went nowhere. For that matter, it would
take another two years before the Saxon Report was finally implemented.
To add to Knapp's woes, the much heralded "Massachusetts miracle" collapsed.
The causes of the fiscal crisis were complex. Following nearly seven years of dramatic growth, the regional economy took a nosedive between 1989 and 1991. At the
same time, the federal government was withdrawing from many areas of domestic
policy, except for Medicaid, leaving it to state and local governments to pick up the
vacated program and funding responsibilities. The state budget became unmanageable. Given a Dukakis administration, which had no respect for the land-grant university, and difficult internal adjustments to meet a future of diminishing resources,
Knapp faced some agonizing problems. Among the worst was the lack of revenue;
there simply was not enough money to do things that seemed absolutely necessary,
such as providing for heating fuel and building maintenance. Although Knapp clam-

erning authority and

ther.

The

of trustees. Indeed,

proposal's principal object

is

to break

ored for more funds, he rarely complained, rarely quarreled with associates, but

went ahead and did the job with the resources
ever,

made him an

educational

Some

at

hand. Such a low-key posture, how-

easy target for criticism. His sharpest

regents, including

Edward Lashman and Paul Tsongas

higher education chancellor Franklyn Jenifer

—

were fellow

state

— along with

state

critics

officials.

tried to abolish the president's office.

maximize his power and gain
he did not stay around very long. He
left in 1989 to accept the presidency of Howard University. These officials developed
a jaundiced view of Knapp, and they were harsh in their judgment of him. Essentially,
they saw him as a colorless and competent bureaucrat. The most searing attack was
launched by Paul Tsongas, who proclaimed that Knapp appeared to do nothing but
"hang on" and "hole himself up in the office." 45 This accusation contained little if
any truth; indeed, it was most unfair. But the steady barrage of criticism about his
low profile and the fact that he became more isolated politically played a part in the
growing disenchantment with Knapp. Some trustees wanted a leader with more vigor
and boldness.

Jenifer, a black, allied himself with local politicians to

more funding

for public higher education, but

In his last years as president,

Knapp seemed

to lose interest in his pressure-filled

Many faculty wondered if the trustees might be thinking ahead to his resignation. If Knapp was a man of practicality who did not undertake risky ventures, he
was also a man of ideals and integrity. Above all, he was a survivor. He lasted for
twelve years
two more than he originally had anticipated. By his own definition,
tasks.

—
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he was a success. It was much to his credit that he did not blame subordinates for
his shortcomings and that he ushered in major structural changes before announcing
his resignation.

Tapping the Heir Apparent
Apart from its timing, Knapp's departure came as no surprise. Under increasing fire
to step down, Knapp wanted to be able to pick his own time to avoid the appearance
that he was being forced out. In the fall of 1989, Governor Dukakis was still thinking
about abolishing the office of president, but the trustees at UMass persuaded him otherwise. Delicate negotiations along these lines were worked out with the governor's
office. While this was going on, Knapp was visiting the University of Hokkaido in
Japan, where former UMass president William Smith Clark had helped to establish an
agricultural college in 1876.

The trustees had in mind the person they wanted to succeed Knapp. He was
Joseph Duffey, the Amherst chancellor, whom they considered the heir apparent. To
close observers, it was evident for some time that Duffey was being groomed for the
job. A confident and charming individual, he had served as chancellor at Amherst
since 1982. For these eight years, he had been an effective campus leader as well as a
national spokesman for public higher education. His gracious manner and personal
charm put everyone at ease. But more important were his close political ties with
Governor Dukakis. They were best

friends.

Duffey had

skillfully

used

his relation-

ship with the governor to help the university during the early stages of the fiscal
crisis.

While Duffey waited

in the wings, his reputation

soared while Knapp's plum-

meted. However, Duffey was seen by some faculty as being smooth but indecisive.

Born

in 1932, Duffey, the

son of a West Virginia coal miner, was ordained as a

age of eighteen. He graduated from Marshall Univerand received a doctoral degree from the Hartford Seminary in 1969. While still in
divinity school, Duffey entered politics in Connecticut and campaigned for Eugene
McCarthy during the 1968 presidential campaign. In 1970 he ran unsuccessfully for
the U.S. Senate, losing to Republican Lowell Weicker. Six years later he worked in
Jimmy Carter's presidential campaign, which led to a job in the state department. He
then served as chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities.
The trustees sensed that other schools might lure Duffey away before Knapp
officially stepped down, a prospect that worried them. In 1989, word of Duffey's
candidacy at Northeastern University had appeared in the local press, which put
the trustees on notice. He was then considered for the presidency of the University
of Delaware. Reading these newspaper stories, some trustees questioned Duffey's
loyalty, especially since the fiscal situation turned sour at the university. Others contemplated taking unilateral action and putting him in office without any faculty

Southern Baptist minister

at the

sity

participation or consultation.

Rumors about Duffey leaving to accept a job elsewhere continued to circulate and
heightened the trustees' anxiety. The trustees assiduously courted Duffey and informally asked him to become president. It was common knowledge that he wanted to
be near his wife, Anne Wexler, an influential Democrat who worked as a lobbyist in
Washington. The couple had what is known as a commuter marriage. The trustees

now made

it

even more

attractive, they

convenient for him to travel there on long weekends. To

make

things

agreed to boost the president's salary to $130,000.
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No word was

said of any search during the

fall

of 1989, which aroused suspicion

some faculty members. Those at Amherst surmised that board chairman Gordon
Oakes was not anxious to conduct a full-scale search. Others speculated that
Oakes and the rest of the trustees were ready to cut a deal. Although the Amherst
faculty for the most part was favorably disposed toward Duffey, they were distressed that a national search was not being undertaken and because they were not
in

Bob Wood and

being consulted.

As

that the trustees

would make a preemptive

fait

in the cases of

strike

Franklin Patterson, they feared

and announce

their selection as a

accompli.

As things turned out their fears were well founded. By the time the trustees met
on February 22, 1990, they had definitely made up their minds. Joe Duffey was their
choice to succeed Knapp. At this meeting, Knapp, in a gracious gesture, stepped aside
for the sake of the university and announced his plans to retire effective on March 16,
a date he deliberately chose for symbolic reasons.

March

17,

Evacuation

Day in

folk County, celebrates the anniversary of the British troops evacuating Boston.
this satirical note, the trustees

Suf-

On

accepted Knapp's resignation and announced that they

were consolidating the positions of university president and chancellor at Amherst.
Some faculty, however, were not pleased with the idea of Duffey. A few of them
from the Boston campus attended the trustee meeting to protest his appointment.
They pleaded their case, but to no avail. It was already a done deal. Still, they argued
that such a move would favor the Amherst campus and penalize Worcester and

As an alternative, they asked the trustees to create a rotating presidency
among the three campus chancellors. Moreover, they urged that their chancellor,
Boston.

Sherry Penney, be given proper consideration. In response to their pleas, Chairman

Oakes

flatly

rejected the idea of a rotating presidency. While expressing understand-

ing for their concerns, he replied,

"A university cannot be run by committee.

strong leader and a strong spokesman. Chancellor Duffey
46
see in the presidency."

the

new president,

The

is

the candidate

It

needs a

we want

to

unanimously to approve Duffey as
the decision to continue with the leadership he had

trustees then voted

resulting in

already demonstrated.

With the consolidation of the two

positions,

Duffey

in effect

wore two

hats, serving

both as president of the university and chancellor of the Amherst campus. This was a

throwback to the situation that had existed prior to 1969. Quickly taking on the board
of regents, Duffey, who had earlier remained silent on the issue, began to speak out.
He strongly criticized the regents for its excessive centralization and blamed the
agency for the stifling regulation of public higher education. After laying off many of
Knapp's staff, Duffey operated mainly out of Amherst and was hardly ever seen at 250
Stuart Street in Boston. Moreover, he relied heavily on his provost, Richard O'Brien,
to run things on campus.
Duffey's stay was stormy and short. With the deepening of the economic recession,

and other emergency fiscal measures were quickly put in
good friend Michael Dukakis was about to leave
the governorship. Having declared that he would not seek reelection, Dukakis was the
lamest of political lame ducks whose power and influence had waned substantially.
Without a forceful party leader at the helm, the Democrats in the state were in political
disarray. Neglect of public services and evasion of costly financing of programs were the
47
result. For all practical purposes, state government had become paralyzed.
the budget ax continued to
place.

To add

fall

to his troubles, Duffey's
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In the

fall

of 1990, Republican William Weld, a Yankee Brahmin, was elected gover-

Democratic opponent, John Silber, who was on leave as president of
in a bitter and closely contested election. Once in office, Weld called
for draconian budget cuts in higher education and the possible closing of state colleges."
Naturally, his announced plans did not sit well with the educational establishment.
Shortly afterward, Randolph Bromery, Franklyn Jenifer's replacement as the
nor, defeating his

Boston University,

18

interim chancellor of the board of regents, suddenly resigned in protest.
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Three days

both Bromery and regents chairman Paul Tsongas questioned Weld's commitment to public higher education. 50 At about the same time, a few other senior adminislater,

trators

announced

Under

that they

were leaving Massachusetts to take jobs elsewhere.

these chaotic circumstances, the morale of the dejected faculty reached

lowest point. Suffering from four years of severe budget cuts, the faculty had

battered and discouraged.

became

The

fiscal picture

its

become

continued to deteriorate as impending

and mandatory fees were raised
crisis atmosphere created by these
setbacks during the winter of 1991, a sense of gloom and doom pervaded the university. Internal disaffection increased. With little possibility of state finances being put
on a sound footing, the situation was dire.
In the best of all possible worlds, Duffey would have been motivated to improve the
situation, but he did not have the resources to do so. Depressed in spirit, he decided
that it was time for him to move on. On March 1, 1991, the local press broke the story
51
that he had been chosen as president of American University in Washington. The
UMass trustees were somewhat surprised by this news. Many of them were upset,
because they felt that Duffey had used his one year in office to further his own career.
Viewed in this context, they felt put down, hurt, and angry, because they realized that
they had been exploited by him. While his resignation did not take effect until June 30,
his quick exit was not appreciated.
Given the energetic courtship of Duffey, it is certainly understandable that the
trustees might have harbored such feelings. After all, they had spent their entire political
capital in bringing him aboard. In their eyes, he had jumped ship precisely when they
needed him most to lead the university out of the crisis. In fairness, it should be pointed
out that Duffey had devoted nine years of service to the institution. Upon calmer
52
reflection, the trustees later acknowledged the overall contribution he had made.
layoffs

inevitable. Student tuition rates

repeatedly to offset the budget shortfalls. In the

A Politicized Search
No sooner had Duffey announced his resignation than a search for his successor began
within a few weeks.

The

trustees

met

to discuss the issue

on March 21

at the

medical

school in Worcester. At this meeting, they decided to separate the two positions of
president and chancellor at Amherst and conduct spearate searches for each post. It
was further decided to retain the Boston location for the president's office. Since
Duffey had spent most of his time at Amherst, there was some concern that it might
be relocated there. When the question of an interim president was discussed, trustee

Thalia Zervas promptly expressed her belief that the person so designated not be

eligi-

become a candidate for the permanent position. Other trustees disagreed, but
the matter was left unresolved for the moment. Chairman Oakes asked for volunteers
to serve on the presidential search committee. Nine trustees expressed their willing-

ble to
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They included Judith Baker, James Carlin, Lawrence DiCara,
Michael Foley, Robert Haynes, Gordon Oakes, Mary Reed, and Thalia Zervas. The
ninth, James O'Leary, former general manager of the MBTA and an alumnus of
ness to be appointed.

UMass/Boston, chaired the presidential search committee. 53
The composition of the search committee came under immediate attack. Once
again, no provision was made for faculty participation. Unlike the Duffey episode, however, the faculty was at least consulted. Deeply devoted to the university, Chairman
Oakes was nervous about how to go about conducting a search that would avoid the
blunders of the previous time. Prior to the search, he addressed the faculty senate at
Amherst on March 14. Five days later, a few Boston faculty members visited him at his
business office in Springfield to discuss their concerns. They were particularly disturbed
by rumors that Joe Duffey might be grooming a successor. Word had it that he wanted
to slip Thomas O'Brien into the position as quickly and quietly as possible. A capable
administrator, O'Brien was dean of the School of Management at Amherst. He was
well connected in Republican Party circles, supposedly having close ties with Governor
William Weld and having previously worked in the Frank Sargent administration.
In any case, the Amherst faculty were furious at their exclusion from the search
committee. On April 22, Professor Arthur Kenney, board faculty representative, wrote
a letter to William Searson, the trustees' lawyer, protesting the fact that the faculty had
not been accorded full membership on the search committees. He complained that
54
the board had failed to comply with the precepts of the Wellman report. So again the
search began in a not uncommon atmosphere of suspicion between faculty and trustees.
On the same day that Kenney wrote his letter, the search committee met with senior
administrators and faculty leaders from the three campuses. In anticipation of the
pending merger under the Saxon Commission plan, their counterparts from SMU and
Lowell were also invited. Everyone was asked to respond to a series of questions prepared by search chairman James O'Leary. These ranged from the qualifications and
experience needed for the presidency to recommendations for the interim position. 55
Early in the search, the trustees decided to bar the interim president from eligibility for the permanent position, following the precedent they had set in 1977 when
Franklin Patterson had been named interim president. At the outset, the search committee asked themselves the question: Who would be the ideal candidate under these
circumstances? They concluded that it would probably be a retiring president who was
familiar with a multicampus system. Hence they initially drew on a ready-made list of
retired presidents and other high academic officers who could be counted on to manage well in an interim presidency without desiring the permanent post. They reviewed
some twenty-five biographical sketches, including those of people like David Saxon,
the chair of the MIT Corporation and president emeritus of the University of California; Derek Bok, the retiring president of Harvard; and Greg Adamian, the retiring
president of Bentley College. Most of the prospects came from within Massachusetts.
After considering the biographical material, the search group narrowed its list to
five candidates. Almost immediately, their names were leaked to the press by an
unknown source. The list included David Bartley, president of Holyoke Community
College, Randolph Bromery, former regents chancellor, William Hogan, president of
the University of Lowell,

Thomas

O'Brien, dean of the School of Management at

at Boston. Penney was the only female candiand with Duffey's expected departure, she was the most senior administrator at
the university. She followed academic protocol in that she waited to be drafted rather

Amherst, and Sherry Penney, chancellor
date,
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than actively campaign for the interim post. Penney allowed her
after several faculty

members urged her

name

to

go forward

to follow this course. 56

The news of Bartley's candidacy caused considerable consternation in some quarA Massachusetts native, he was viewed as a local candidate. The son of Irish
working-class parents, Bartley was born in Holyoke in 1935. He had come up the hard
way. His father, who worked at the local gas company, died when he was a freshman in
high school. At the time, there were no pension or death benefits, so young Bartley
knew what it meant to grow up poor. Before going to UMass on a basketball scholarters.

ship,

In

he had attended Holyoke Junior College. 57

many ways,

Bartley presented a paradox.

political credentials,

On the one

hand, he had impressive

having served as speaker of the Massachusetts House of Repre-

from 1963 to 1975 and as secretary of finance and administration in the Ed
King administration. On the other hand, he had proved himself to be an able administrator as president of Holyoke Community College and chairman of the public college
presidents council. Unquestionably, he was the most visible and the most outspoken
advocate for public higher education in the state. Furthermore, he had written a position paper in which he outlined his views on the future of UMass. 58
The paradox extended to Bartley's academic qualifications. A graduate of UMass/
Amherst, he had obtained four degrees from his alma mater
a bachelor of arts, a
master's, an earned Ed.D., and an honorary doctorate. To drive home the point,
Bartley was highly touted in the press as being a "quadruple Minuteman," but his
opponents were not impressed. They pointed out that he was president of a community college, not a major college or university. Since he did not come from the university world, they argued, he would not carry much weight with the faculty. Measured by
the rigorous standards of the academy, Bartley did not pass the litmus test of quality,
at least in the minds of some trustees.
Trustee James Carlin, who had supported Weld in his bid for the governorship,
lobbied hard in behalf of Bartley and was his main sponsor. The supporters of Bartley argued that the former speaker could serve them well in the competition for
state funding. In their minds, no one could match Bartley in terms of his familiarity
with Massachusetts higher education and his knowledge of state politics and the
budgetary process. These assets, as well as his personal relationships with various
political and business leaders, made him an attractive candidate for president. With
the devastating budget cuts that the university had suffered in recent years, Bartley's supporters were afraid that its premier position within the public higher education system would be jeopardized. They therefore wanted someone who could
work well with the legislature and would stay in the presidency longer than Joe
Duffey had. Since the university and its medical center received a great deal of federal money, they contended that Bartley's local Massachusetts ties would be very
sentatives

—

useful in securing such funding.
Bartley, playing to localist sentiment, steadfastly refused to accept the idea that this

was a temporary appointment. He apparently believed that if he got the job, he could
provide dramatic leadership that would make people forget about its being temporary.
Given the original instructions to the search committee regarding the interim nature
of the appointment, a few people wondered about the wisdom of his stance. This
clumsy strategy eventually backfired and helped to seal his fate. Having gone this far,
however, Bartley did not pull back. He was prepared to fight for the position in the
face of mounting opposition.
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smear campaign to discredit his candidacy.
was administratively qualified to do the job; others did not.
Those in the latter category attacked him on various grounds. A prevalent theme in
complaints about Bartley was his Democratic political connections. His opponents
went after him for having once worked for conservative Governor King, who in the
late 1970s was the most powerful symbol of opposition to Dukakis's liberal policies.
This implied that Bartley was politically incorrect. Castigating him in these terms was a
mode of communication that played well at the political extremes. It is useful to keep
in mind that most of this smear activity occurred outside the board of trustees.
But the pressure to back away from Bartley grew almost irresistible. His adversaries wanted someone with an extensive background as a teacher and scholar as well
as an administrator. In their view, Bartley did not meet these criteria. Prior to his
political career, he had taught at a junior high school in Springfield and coached
athletics at Holyoke Catholic High School. More serious was that Bartley had no
scholarly record whatsoever. According to one trustee, committee members were
attempting to measure him by the same standards that Harvard had recently used to
measure Neil Rudenstine, its new president. They downplayed Bartley's legislative
accomplishments, which were substantial. Four members of the search committee
(Baker, DiCara, Oakes, and Zervas) preferred to go with a retired university president who was familiar with operating a multicampus system. Publicity about all of
this buffeted people on both sides.
The search was filled with traps and surprises. On May 15, the same day that the
UMass trustees were able to slide around the awkward problem of appointing an
interim chancellor as permanent chancellor of the medical school, the trustees of
Cape Cod Community College named former state senator Richard Kraus its new
president. Kraus was not an Irish politician, but he was well connected politically. He
was a liberal Dukakis Democrat with Harvard credentials. The Kraus affair muddied
the waters by suggesting that a double standard existed. The anti-Bartley forces, however, pointed out that being named to head a community college, even a particularly
notable one, as Cape Cod Community College is, was not the same as heading a major
university. By the same token, they contended that naming a community college president to become secretary of education (as Weld had in appointing Piedad Robertson)
was quite different from appointing a person with this kind of background to head a
"public Ivy" university like the one at Amherst.
Governor Weld finally intervened. In early May, he wrote a letter to the trustees
asking them to delay their appointment of a president until they had conducted a
national search. Weld was stalling for time. Bartley surmised that these tactics were
an effort to derail his candidacy. 60 In retrospect, he was correct in his appraisal.
At this point, the search committee hired the executive recruiting firm of Korn/Ferry
International, which was directed to identify three to five out-of-state candidates. But
Massachusetts's fiscal troubles had been widely publicized, making it difficult for the
firm to attract good candidates. It initially approached John Brademas, the president
of New York University, but Brademas declined. In the face of mounting pressure to
appoint someone from Massachusetts, the search firm was able to persuade three outof-state prospects to apply. They were Elbert
Fretwell, former chancellor of the
University of North Carolina at Charlotte, James Norton, interim chancellor of the
University of Maryland, and Lawrence Pettit, former chancellor of the University
Bartley's detractors then launched a

Some

trustees felt that he

59

K

System of South Texas.
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Fretwell was a highly respected administrator generally recognized for leadership
talent.

figure.

His slender six-foot-seven frame and urbane manner made him a commanding
Academicians typically are not fond of any administrators, but they are more

willing to accept people with

orthodox backgrounds as top executives. Fretwell 's presand Columbia) were accompanied by his real

tigious credentials (Wesleyan, Harvard,

and his reputation as an academic
was president of SUNY College at
Buffalo, one of the reasons, perhaps, he so actively and successfully sought national
visibility. He had been a member of both the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education headed by Clark Kerr and its successor commission. Local custom in North
Carolina had forced Fretwell to retire at age sixty-five, but he is not the retiring type.
On the contrary, he is full of vigor and energy. Besides, he was no newcomer to the
accomplishments, evidenced

in his scholarship

administrator. Before going to North Carolina, he

political realities of

higher education in Massachusetts. In the

summer

of 1986,

Fretwell had been a finalist in the search for a chancellor to the board of regents.

As

a result, he was battle-tested and combat-hardened, but according to him, hardly
any scar tissue remained.
In more ways than one, the current search was an almost identical replay of the
61

fierce

power

struggle that

had taken place

in 1986.

Many of the same themes resur-

faced, especially with regard to issues of class, ethnicity,

and

quality. In the earlier

encounter, Governor Dukakis had strongly opposed the selection of James Collins, a

The governor immediately intervened in the dispute and
soon removed Collins from office. 62 Anyone comparing the events that transpired in
1986 and 1991 cannot help but notice the amazing similarities between the two
searches. In fact, Bartley and Collins shared a great deal in common. Both came from
Irish working-class backgrounds and were native-son candidates. Both were former
state representatives and graduates of UMass/Amherst. Their experiences were
lawyer and a nonacademic.

incredibly similar.

—

So the search committee went back to its list of eight
the five in-state candidates
and the three from out of state. They interviewed all of them one by one. As a gesture
of good will, Alan Solomont and Robert Karam, who chaired the board of trustees at
Lowell and SMU, respectively, were invited to sit in on these interviews. Both were
adamantly opposed to Bartley. The presidents of Lowell and SMU would probably
not have agreed to enter a joint university system under the leadership of a man who
was, in hierarchical terms, "below" them. Sherry Penney, the chancellor at Boston,
presented a special problem. Her departure from her current post would cause instability at the Boston campus. The trustees were sensitive to this issue. Careful not to
63

get caught in the political crossfire, she wisely stepped aside so as not to create the

appearance of blocking Bartley. Most trustees

felt

that neither

Randolph Bromery nor

Thomas O'Brien interviewed well. To some, Bromery appeared tired and burned out,
while O'Brien came across as arrogant. After the interviews, both were eliminated
from further consideration. Desiring

to

remain

eligible for the

permanent

position,

William Hogan took himself out of contention, withdrawing from the search.
Politics

continued to play a major role in the search. To counteract his opposition,

among them former governor Frank Sargent, Senate president William Bulger, and House speaker Charles FlaBartley got powerful people to support his candidacy, chief

herty. In the print and electronic media, Bartley was endorsed by David Nyhan, a
Boston Globe columnist, and James Coppersmith, the station manager of local WCVBTV, Channel 5. M The UMass Alumni Association at Amherst also endorsed Bartley,
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who

obtained the backing of other prominent people. For example, Ronald Perry, the

Holy Cross, reportedly contacted trustee Ronald Teixeira, formerly a basketball athlete at Holy Cross, and convinced him that Bartley was a
worthy candidate. These bold steps taken by Bartley were calculated to bolster his
athletic director at

declining fortunes.

upon the ethnic and class issue by alludand snobbery. He contrasted Weld's Harvard education and
upper-crust social background to Bartley's UMass schooling and blue-collar workingclass upbringing. The patrician governor stood out as a symbol of privilege and wealth.
Commenting on the anti-Irish bias involved, a spokesperson for Flaherty said, "It's
clear that the only obstacle to David Bartley is not his qualifications, but his ethnicity.
And the speaker is extremely angry and disappointed." 65
In addition, Speaker Flaherty played subtly

ing to

Yankee

elitism

As the search process reached its climax, the discord among the trustees became
more intense. It was now strictly a political contest, with the pro-Bartley forces pitted
against the anti-Bartley camp.

Those seeking

to influence the trustees against Bartley

played upon the bifactionalism within the state Democratic Party by portraying the

power struggle as a King versus Dukakis fight. This representation was overdrawn and
James Carlin and James O'Leary
somewhat exaggerated. Only two trustees
had
previously worked in the King administration. In point of fact, all the trustees had
been appointed by Dukakis. Yet the negative symbolism surrounding King was a powerful statement that was used to discredit Bartley.
Hardball politics was the order of the day as the crucial vote neared. Massive pressure and threatened resignations were brought to bear against Bartley. Three trustees
Chairman Gordon Oakes, Judith Baker, and Thalia Zervas
threatened to resign
if the board appointed Bartley.
This last prospect had a powerful appeal, blunting,
temporarily, Bartley's momentum. His opponents, who wanted anyone but Bartley,
were forceful in their activism and mobilization of power. The battle became increas-

—

—

—

—
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ingly nasty; both sides acted excessively.

On May 31
Reed was

the search committee

At

met

for six hours to discuss the finalists.

Mary

David
was a
clear lack of a consensus candidate. In trying to arrive at their recommendation, the
dynamics of the search committee led to a 4 to 4 deadlock. Carlin, Foley, Haynes, and
O'Leary supported Bartley. Four days later, on June 4, the situation remained the
same except that Mary Reed threw her support to Bartley. Thus, the search committee
recommended Bartley to the full board with a 5 to 4 vote. Meanwhile, trustee William
Bowman made a commitment to James Carlin that he would vote for Bartley. So on
the evening before the climactic meeting of the board, the Bartley forces appeared to
absent.

this point,

Bartley, E. K. Fretwell,

they narrowed their short

and James Norton. After

list

to three, namely,

their lengthy discussion, there

have the necessary votes to win.

On June 5, the time for a decision had come.

Realizing that there was a delicate bal-

ance of power among the trustees, the anti-Bartley forces pulled out

all

the political

They sounded the alarm and summoned two trustees who had not planned to
attend the meeting. Alice Huang flew in from New York and Richard Huguenin
arrived from South Deerfield. After giving a brief report about the search, trustee
stops.

O'Leary suggested that the board go into executive session to discuss the reputation
and character of the candidate who was being recommended. 67 Tension tightened as
they engaged in an intense debate over Bartley. Some argued that he did not have
experience in managing a large public institution. Others attacked him on the grounds
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he was insensitive to the Hispanic community in Holyoke. One trustee declared
anyone who had served in the Ed King administration.
Still others contended that if Bartley were appointed president, the university would
be held up to public ridicule by journalists like Howie Carr, who writes for the Boston
Herald. Carr had nothing but contempt for politicians and patronage politics. In rebuttal, the pro-Bartley forces argued that the former speaker knew the Massachusetts
political scene better than any of the other candidates and therefore was best suited to
that

that she could never support

win state support for the university.
These points were driven home as the trustees hotly debated their differences. After
this lengthy and at times acrimonious discussion, the trustees voted while still in closed
session. The vote was close. On the first ballot, the Bartley nomination was defeated
by a slim majority (10 to 9). Whatever the reason, William Bowman reneged on his
commitment to Carlin and switched his vote to Fretwell. Pressured by both sides,
Angus McQuilken and James Canina, the student trustees from Amherst and Boston,
changed their minds at the last minute and turned to Fretwell. By contrast, John
Walsh, the Worcester student trustee, kept his word and stayed with Bartley.
Much to everyone's surprise, the trustees overturned the recommendation of their
search committee by the narrow margin of one vote. On the second ballot, the vote to
68
elect Fretwell as president was unanimous. He was offered a contract with a flexible
term of "no less than six months and no longer than two years." Fretwell's salary was
set at $123,500. Reporter Phyllis Coons of the Boston Globe, who attended the trustee
meeting, described it as a "bare-knuckle political battle complete with grudges,
69
threats, and last-minute arm-twisting.
The pro-Fretwell forces rejoiced in the outcome, but their victory turned out to be
short-lived. Again the secret ballot came back to haunt them. Again the press played
a major role as the vigilant defender of the state's open-meeting law. This time the
Boston Globe filed a complaint with the state attorney general that the trustees had
violated the statute.

Three weeks

later,

on July

1,

Attorney General Scott Harshbarger responded to the

complaint and ruled that the board was in violation. These violations included failure
to notify the candidates of a discussion of their character

session and taking a vote in secret.

He

and reputation while

in closed

therefore invalidated Fretwell's election and

ordered that the June 5 votes pertaining to the interim position be rescinded and revoted

A

in open session.
dismayed Gordon Oakes attempted to put a positive spin on things
by saying, "Nobody was intent on violating any open meeting law. If there was any vio70
lation, it was only because people were not aware of the technical requirements."
The next act in this drama took place on July 9 as the board met to comply with
the attorney general's order. At this final showdown, a few more wrinkles had been
added to the scenario. Since the original vote on June 5, trustee Alice Huang had
resigned, and three new student trustees had been elected to the board. Desperate
to stop Bartley at all costs, Governor Weld appointed and swore in Daniel Taylor as
a trustee that same morning. Taylor, who formerly served on the board of regents
and was identified in the press as a Dukakis loyalist, replaced Alice Huang.
Although the terms of trustees William Bowman and Richard Huguenin had also
expired, they had not yet been replaced and were therefore eligible to vote. To add
to the drama, the new Boston student trustee resigned the day before her term was
to begin. She had returned home to India because of an illness in her family. Appar-
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ently there

was no provision

in the student

governance constitution for anyone to
still in doubt when the board

succeed her. All of which meant that the outcome was

met

to revote.

this one was filled with tension and suspense. Diswhat was happening, trustee William Bowman set the tone of the meeting
with a statement that appeared in the morning press. He was quoted as saying, "To
bring in somebody from out of state and then invite him to go back home
we
would look ridiculous. We'd be the laughingstock of the nation." After a few preliminaries, trustee Lawrence DiCara moved to rescind the votes taken on June 5
and to ratify the agreement confirming Fretwell as interim president. At this point,
trustee William Mahoney offered a motion to substitute the name of Bartley for
Fretwell. By a 9 to 9 vote, with Chairman Oakes casting the deciding vote, the
Mahoney motion was defeated. Mary Reed, who had previously voted for Bartley,
now switched her vote. She felt that they had made a contract with Fretwell and
should not back out of it. The board then voted on DiCara's original motion, which
was passed unanimously. Sober second thoughts prevented them from remaining
deadlocked. It began to dawn on everyone that their efforts to find a president
might end in abysmal failure. Putting aside their personal differences, they voted to

Like the previous meeting,

mayed

at

—
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approve Fretwell. 72
Fretwell's confirmation

was a tremendous

relief for

Gordon Oakes. Because he

believed that Fretwell was the best person for the job, the days since the attorney gen-

had quite possibly been more agonizing for him than for Fretwell. Now
Oakes could put his mind at ease. His choice had prevailed.
The next day, Fretwell received an unexpected dividend, praise of his appointment

eral's ruling

by the Boston Globe.

UMass

Its editorial

read: "It wasn't easy or even very pretty, but the

trustees did the right thing yesterday in reaffirming their decision to appoint

E. K. Fretwell as interim president of the school. Bartley might have done well, but to

the outside world the appointment of a

a discordant signal.
as

On that basis alone,

man

steeped in local politics would have sent

Fretwell, an outsider with big-time experience

an academic manager, was the superior choice." 73

chapter in the ritual of presidential succession at

On this positive note,

the latest

UMass was concluded.

A day later, on July 11, 1991, Governor Weld signed into law the historic piece of
legislation creating the

new five -campus university.

In the end, the

power of those who

favored the Saxon Commission plan had prevailed over the power of those
favored the regents,

who

who were now defunct.

A Comparative Analysis
meanings
and observers. Indeed, the activity surrounding each
search has served as a barometer of how the trustees, faculty, students, and alumni
feel about their institution, revealing their aspirations and their misgivings. To quote
McLaughlin and Riesman again: "Like perhaps no other event in the life of an institution, the search for a president reveals the politics, protocols, and promise of the
American academic enterprise." Even more revealing is the distribution of power
among the major players, including the governor and legislative leadership. Depending upon how this power gets played out, the outcome will be influenced accordingly.
In retrospect,

it is

clear that these five presidential searches carry different

for the different participants

74
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As happens regularly, because of the culture of the state, the search becomes political,
no matter what committee structure or procedural safeguards are employed. Consequently, the key to a successful search depends to a large extent on the "representativeness" of the process and the participation of all parties-at-interest. For the search to be
considered legitimate, it must include the major stakeholders within the university community. Exclusion of faculty members from search committees, as we have seen, has
frequently caused antagonism to the searches. Such antagonism tends to generate suspicion and mistrust, which in turn undermine the effectiveness of the incumbent.
Because of the brevity of their terms and the lack of stakeholder participation in
their eventual appointment, both Franklin Patterson and Joseph Duffey were handicapped in establishing their legitimacy. To some extent, this was also true of Robert
Wood, who found himself in an embarrassing situation through no fault of his own.
In his case, however, UMass astounded itself, for the flawed search produced an
altogether unexpected outcome. Wood was a topflight choice for president. The late
Joseph Healey was probably correct in his assessment when he said, "We got the right
guy, but the wrong way." Given this mood, Wood was literally the right person in the
right job. Yet he was never able to overcome the perceived illegitimacy of his presidency, at least not at Amherst. On the other hand, David Knapp was the product of a
procedurally flawless textbook search in which the trustees followed both the letter
and spirit of their governance document. As a result, Knapp was not only assured a
smooth transition, but was also more readily accepted by the entire university. This
contrast illustrated an important lesson that the trustees had learned.
It is also worth noting that the presidents who have become the most effective leaders have been men of driving ambition and fierce concentration who pursue their
goals relentlessly. Wood was such a personality and in a different way so was Knapp.
Wood set his sights on achieving national recognition for the university and spared no
one, including himself, in his drive to get there. His determination never flagged.

Knapp pursued his goal of a first-class university in a much different way. His academic experience, his conciliatory tactics, and his capacity to persuade all help account
for his tangible achievements. Neither Patterson nor Duffey remained in office long
enough to realize their dreams. Both of them were insiders who parlayed that advantage to the top. They were both short-termers and their mundane records reflected as
much. Because Duffey left so soon, he did not live up to expectations.
In the search that produced Fretwell, the trustees acted throughout as if it was a
political contest between the King and the Dukakis forces. In what turned out to be
a clamorous and public spectacle, it seemed clear enough that the emphasis was on
power and conflict. But in this King versus Dukakis, Irish versus non-Irish, or whatever, combat, how did the concerns of faculty get factored into it at all? Their concerns seem to have gotten lost in the heat of battle. Similarly, what about the students for whom this political issue might not be salient? Their interests also got
buried. Both students and alumni were represented on the board of trustees.
The faculty, who were not even represented on the search committee, were in
effect disenfranchised.

The

consummate political insider versus an academic
from out of state. In a judgment call that was much too close for comfort,
the trustees opted to go with Fretwell. He now faces a formidable task, because the
university is in a very delicate position. Fretwell's tact and diplomacy will be sorely
decision rested between a

insider
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works out the new relationships of the five-campus university. Hopehe will be able to play a major role in rebuilding the strength of academic
departments that have been decimated by the terrible losses sustained during the past
few years. Although it is still too early to know for sure whether Fretwell will succeed
tested as he

fully,

in this

endeavor, the prospects for the university look promising. The

configuration should give

it

new institutional

a stronger voice locally as well as a stronger national pres-

As an interim president, Fretwell, too, will be a short-termer, and we ought not
more than he can possibly deliver in the allotted time frame.
The treatment David Bartley received should not be ignored or dismissed lightly. If

ence.

to expect

he was the product of a virulent localism, he was also the victim of a political smear.
Did the trustees hurt their own cause in rejecting him? Answers to this question have
remained highly partisan and extremely sensitive politically. It is not possible to mea-

damage that resulted from the dispute and the negative
accompanied it. Suffice it to say that residual animosities still linger in
some powerful quarters. To overlook that resentment is, in my judgment, a mistake.
Fortunately, Bartley behaved decently, made no attempt to get back at anyone, and
sure precisely the political

publicity that

accepted his defeat graciously.

Why did

happen? The easy explanation is to blame it on trustee collusion
The true answer is more complex. For one thing, Bartley's candidacy had been in the works for some time. Like his predecessor David Knapp,
Fretwell was a late entry, brought in from the outside as the prescribed antidote for
the local front-runner. Many of the key participants liked Fretwell, whose particular
abilities matched their specific needs. The mobilization of the pro-Fretwell trustees
would seem in part to reflect a campaign to discredit Bartley, who by all accounts is a
decent man, but whose effectiveness locally might have been partially blunted by lack
of recognition nationally and in Washington. For some of the trustees, or those who
tried to persuade the trustees, the national issue was more important than what Howie
Carr might write or say on his daunting talk show. Surprisingly, Governor William
Weld comes off rather well in the outcome. Why did he care so much? His role would
suggest more interest in public higher education than he had indicated earlier.
In hindsight, the Bartley supporters felt that their man could do more for the university than any outsider. His rejection disappointed both the Amherst alumni and the
Irish legislative leaders, if for no other reason than that one of their own had been
rejected. The class distinctions and the issues of ethnicity and elitism merely exacerbated their resentment. It is striking, of course, and David Bartley is the most recent
illustration of what might be thought of as a certain antagonism toward Catholics. This
is all the more surprising when one considers that Massachusetts has a very high proportion of Catholic citizens whose offspring attend public colleges in equally high
and

all this

politics as usual.

numbers. In the university as in

society, as

our cultural cleavages have widened, they

run deep and have importance for the future.
In the aftermath of the battle, Alan Lupo, a Boston Globe columnist, referred to the

reflect divisions that

whole

affair as

Fretwell for
Catholic.

The

its

"UMass's self-inflicted wound." His attack on the candidacy of E. K.
elitism and snobbery is a powerful column by a man who is not an Irish

As Lupo

argues:

seem to have gone out of their way to
whose cooperation is crucial to the university's future
Those trustees reflected the elitist concerns of some faculty who worried that
they might look bad in the eyes of their peers in Cambridge or elsewhere if they
University of Massachusetts trustees

alienate state legislators

.
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picked a community college president as their leader.
all right,

but

it is

also a job for a

cal culture of the state

and

Even making allowances
have some merit. First of

for

all,

its

its

good

players.

politician,

It is

a job for an educator,

somebody who knows

parochialism, Lupo's argument, in

UMass is

the politi-

75

not Harvard, and vice versa.

my opinion,

The two

does

institu-

and serve very different academic missions. Second,
"good politicians" have gone on to become
effective university presidents. Terry Sanford at Duke University, John Brademas at
NYU, and Lamar Alexander at Tennessee come readily to mind. It is also interesting
to observe that three of the five modern UMass presidents (Wood, Patterson, and
Knapp) were all political scientists or professional students of politics. One who was
not, Duffey, had been a theologian and a professional politician before becoming
tions are very different in nature

there

is

ample evidence

to suggest that

president. For that matter, Fretwell,

Czechoslovakia,
that the political

who served

a stint as the U.S. vice consul to

an academic politician in the best sense of the term. The point
element is an essential aspect of the job. Public figures who are

is

is

proven leaders should not be automatically excluded from consideration simply
because they have devoted part of their careers to public service. Surely, there is a life
after politics. One must be able to look beyond mere partisanship and determine what

whole institution.
Given what has happened to UMass in recent years in terms of fiscal deprivation,
one can reasonably argue that the political pedigree of a president may be as important as his or her academic credentials. It was certainly true of both Wood and Duffey.
In reality, Duffey's political connections with Dukakis were valued more highly by the
trustees than his academic discipline in theology. Some would contend that modern
presidents, in matters that really count, still need to act essentially as Robert Wood did
but would never openly acknowledge it.
Today the complexities of university life increasingly demand a president who can
operate and feel comfortable in both the political world and the academic world. This is
especially true at a land-grant university, which depends so much on public funding. To
cling to the idea that the office of president is primarily an executive one is to continue
a criterion that neither tells us what a university president does nor what he should do.
To be a president requires an understanding of history, of culture, and of human nature
and a capacity to exert sufficient intellectual and moral energy to bind together people
of diverse interests and commitments. He or she must be able to inspire, inform,
encourage, and embolden all those who have a stake in public higher education.
Having pointed this out, I hasten to add that I do not assume that professional academics lack the necessary political skills. This study suggests otherwise. But the culture
of the academy is vastly different from the culture of Beacon Hill. In order to be effective, a president must be able to operate in both spheres. Equally important, I think
the involvement of the Massachusetts political leadership in these searches has gone
beyond what is desirable. As we have seen, the intervention by governors tends to provoke a counterintervention by legislative leaders. It is precisely at this juncture that
political interference destroys the integrity of the search process and robs the institution of its autonomy.
As mentioned earlier, the search mechanism formulated in the Wellman report is
the only adequate method yet devised for permitting significant participation in the
choosing of a new president. Because it provides representation for the major stakeholders and is a practical way of doing things, I value highly its function of resolving
is

in the best interests of the
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Not even the

would claim that it does all
no one has yet provided any substitute for
assuring faculty and students that they will have some say in the outcome. That maximum involvement is going to be difficult is no reason to turn back from it.
It is particularly encouraging to note that the trustees have already agreed to embrace
the principles of the Wellman report in conducting the upcoming search for a permanent president. At its meeting on June 5, 1991, the board approved a resolution calling
for a search committee that included "voting representatives from each of the campuses." This policy should go a long way toward ameliorating some of the problems
basic conflicts of interest.

strongest advocates

these things completely satisfactorily, but

that have plagued recent searches.

one is struck by two things. First, the title "president" is
remained constant about the position. Second, one cannot help but
observe that several UMass presidents have gone on to other presidencies, beginning
with Kenyon Butterfield in 1924. A change in governors and regents or a shift in political winds can make life untenable for a president. Still and all, it is perhaps a compliment to the University of Massachusetts
or even to the searches that produced
them
that these presidents are considered desirable "catches" by other institutions.
By looking back, we look ahead, identifying what is worthwhile to preserve from the
past by way of predictive value and carry it into the future. If our capacity to predict
the probable effectiveness of presidents is not very imposing, we can at least be sure
that the quality of our picks over the past two decades has been top grade. Z*>
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ERRATA
With regard to Richard Hogarty's article, "Searching for a UMass President:
isitions and Leaderships, 1970-1991," footnotes 66 and 67 were printed incorrectly.
y

should read as follows:

Chairman Gordon Oakes has taken exception to this statement. He claims that he
never actually threatened to resign and that he was misquoted in the press. Oakes
defended his position by saying: "I told the news media that I would have trouble
working with Bartley if he became president." Interview with Gordon Oakes,
September 23, 1991.
Minutes of the meeting of the Board of Trustees, June

5,

1991.

